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shares is equal to ( j/L)H (S L ). Furthermore, strong (k, L, n) ramp SSSs are proposed in [4] . In weak (k, L, n) ramp SSSs, some of S i in S L may leak explicitly if k − j shares leak for 1 ≤ j ≤ L − 1. But, in strong (k, L, n) ramp SSSs, any information of any (S i 1 , S i 2 , . . . , S i j ) does not leak even if k − j shares leak for 1 ≤ j ≤ L − 1. Hence, strong (k, L, n) ramp SSSs are desirable for security.
An important issue on SSSs is cheating detection. An attacker may forge shares in order to make the decoder to decode an incorrect secret. Such cheating is classified into impersonation attacks and substitution attacks. In the impersonation attacks, an attacker forges shares without knowing the legitimate shares. On the other hand, in the substitution attacks, an attacker forges shares after he/she gets the legitimate shares.
For (k, n) SSSs, cheating-detectable schemes are well studied [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Ogata et al. [6] derived a lower bound on the size of shares for the given success probability of substitution attack, and proposed a scheme which achieves the lower bound. Cabello et al. [7] also proposed another scheme against substitution attacks which is almost optimum in the sense of share size.
It is also known that mutual information of shares plays an important role in the detection of impersonation attacks. Iwamoto et al. [9] defined correlation level based on mutual information of shares, and proved coding theorems using correlation level for blockwise (2, 2) SSSs against impersonation attacks. Koga and Koyano [10] extended the definition of correlation level to symbolwise (k, n) SSSs to prove coding theorems.
On the other hand, for ramp SSSs, Ogata [13] proposed a scheme against substitution attacks. Also, Cramer et al. [8] defined a notion of algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes, and proposed a method to convert SSSs into cheatingdetectable ones. By applying AMD codes to ramp SSSs, we can construct ramp SSSs against substitution attacks. But, these schemes do not satisfy fully the security condition of (k, L, n) ramp SSSs. Furthermore, there is no research on ramp SSSs based on correlation level.
In this paper, we treat cheating-detectable (k, L, n) ramp SSSs and analyze the security of schemes based on correlation level as [9] and [10] . First, we derive lower bounds on the sizes of the shares and random number used in encoding, and the success probabilities of attacks for given correlation level. We also derive lower bounds on the success probabilities of attacks for the given size of shares. Next, we propose a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS against substitution attacks. As far as we know, the proposed scheme is the first one that satisfies fully the condition of strong (k, L, n) ramp SSSs and can detect substitution attacks of at most k − 1 shares. Our scheme can be applied to a secret S L uniformly distributed over GF(p m ) L , where p is a prime number with p ≥ L + 2.
For a given certain type of correlation level, our strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS can attain the optimal sizes of the shares and random number. Furthermore, our scheme can reduce the success probability of substitution attacks within nearly L times its lower bound when the number of forged shares a satisfies 1 ≤ a ≤ k − 1. We also evaluate the success probability of impersonation attack for our schemes.
When L = 1, our scheme corresponds to the (k, n) SSS treated by Cabello et al., but how to extend their scheme to (k, L, n) ramp SSSs is not so trivial.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we describe the notation, the system model, and known results. Then, we consider the converse part of coding theorem in Sect. 3, in which several new lower bounds are derived. Next we consider the direct part of coding theorem in Sect. 4 , and we propose a ramp SSS to prove the direct part. Finally in Sect. 5, we show examples of insecure ramp SSSs to clarify why each component of the proposed scheme is necessary to achieve the required security.
Preliminaries

Notation
Throughout this paper, H p (·) and I p (· ; ·) denote entropy and mutual information with base p in logarithm, respectively. For simplicity of notation, the base is often omitted. 
For a finite set A, |A| stands for the cardinality of A.
System Model
Let S L = S 1 S 2 . . . S L be a secret, where all S j , 1 ≤ j ≤ L, are mutually independent and have the same probability distribution P S over a finite set S. The encoder ϕ, which generates n shares
, where V i is the range of the i-th share V i and R is a uniform random number over a finite set R.
where ⊥ is the special symbol to represent the detection of cheating † . For simplicity of notation, we omit K of ψ K in the following.
(ϕ, ψ) is called a (k, L, n) ramp SSS if it satisfies the following two conditions [4] .
(i) For any K ⊆ [n] with |K | = k, it holds that † In this paper, we always assume that i i for in
(ii) For any j ∈ [L] and for any I ⊆ [n] with |I| = k − j, it holds that
In particular, a (k, L, n) ramp scheme with L = 1 is called a (k, n) SSS. Furthermore, (ϕ, ψ) is called a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS if it satisfies the following condition (iii) besides (i) and (ii). 
If (ϕ, ψ) satisfies (i) and (ii) but not (iii), we call it a weak (k, L, n) ramp SSS. We assume that a cheater can forge at most k − 1 shares out of any k shares. For O = {i 1 , . . . , i a }, let V O and V O be the forged shares and the corresponding original shares, respectively, and let V I be the remaining shares satisfying |I| = k − a and O ∩I = ∅. We consider two types of attacks. An attack without knowing V O , i.e., an attack such that V O is independent of (V O , V I ), is called an impersonation attack. On the other hand, an attack using V O , i.e., an attack such that V I , V O , and V O make a Markov chain in this order, is called a substitution attack † † .
The success of impersonation attacks can be defined by
On the other hand, for substitution attacks, only the latter definition makes sense because the former is always satisfied by V O = V O . Hence, for a forged shares, we consider two kinds of the success probability of impersonation attack, P imp * (a) and P imp(a) , and the success probability of substitution attack, P sub(a) , which are defined as follows † † † :
We suppose that cheaters do not know the secret S L (except for information obtained from V O in substitution attacks). This model is sometimes called OKS model [11] , [12] named after the authors of [6] .
† † † The success of an impersonation attack is usually defined as ψ(V O , V I ) ⊥ (e.g., [9] , [10] ). But, in this paper, we also consider P imp(a) because a lower bound on P imp(a) immediately gives a lower bound on P sub(a) .
Remark 1:
Next, we give the definition of correlation level.
In other words,
Remark 2: Correlation level was introduced in [9] for blockwise (2, 2) SSSs, and the notion was extended to symbolwise (k, n) SSSs in [10] . In [10] , correlation level is defined as (n − 1)-tuple rather than (k − 1)-tuple since decoding from more than k shares is also considered. However, since we only consider decoding from just k shares in this paper, we define correlation level as Definition 1.
Remark 3:
From (7) and the chain rule of mutual information, for any j ∈ [2, k] and distinct j shares
Known Results
For the case without cheating detection, Yamamoto [4] gave a construction of a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS for a secret S L uniformly distributed over GF(p m ) L , where p m satisfies
In Yamamoto's scheme, shares V 1 , . . . , V n ∈ GF(p m ) are given by
Here, (R 1 , . . . , R k−L ) is a uniform random number over GF(p m ) k−L , and A ∈ GF(p m ) k×n is a matrix such that any k column vectors out of {a 1 , . . . , a n , e 1 , . . . , e L } are linearly independent, where {a 1 , . . . , a n } and {e 1 , . . . , e k } denote the n columns of A and the k columns of k-dimensional unit matrix, respectively. The matrix A is called a generator matrix of a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS. Its existence is guranteed if (9) holds. We note that in the case of L = 1, Yamamoto's scheme is reduced to Karnin et al.'s [14] for (k, n) SSSs, which can be applied to S not necessarily uniformly distributed.
Next, we consider schemes with cleating detection capability. For (k, n) SSSs against impersonation attacks, Koga-Koyano [10] derived the following theorem † . † Theorem 1 is a special case of [10, Theorem 1] , which also treats more general attacks than impersonation attacks and decoding with more than k shares.
Theorem 1 ([10, Theorem 1] ): For any
log
Furthermore, Koga-Koyano proposed a scheme which achieves the bounds (11)- (13) when S is uniformly distributed. Ogata et al. [6] derived a lower bound on the success probability of substitution attack for (k, n) SSS with the given size of shares.
From (14), any (k, n) SSS with P sub(a) ≤ δ requires |V i | ≥ (|S| − 1)/δ + 1. Ogata et al. also proposed a scheme which achieves their bound (14) when S is uniformly distributed and the size of shares satisfies a certain condition.
We also note that Cabello et al. [7] proposed another (k, n) SSS with detection of substitution attacks † † , which corresponds to the case of L = 1 of our (k, L, n) ramp SSS proposed in Sect. 4.
Converse Part
In this section, we will derive lower bounds on the sizes of the shares and random number used in encoding and the success probabilities of attacks. We also give bounds on the success probabilities of attacks for the given size of shares. Theorems 3 and 4 hold for any base of logarithm larger than 1, as long as the same base is used for entropy, mutual information, and correlation level. For simplicity of notation, we omit the base of logarithm.
s scheme is for general access structures.
where
Lower bounds (15)- (17) can be proved in the same way as Theorem 1, i.e. [10, Theorem 1] . Note that (17) does not give any lower bound of P imp(a) and P sub(a) as described in Remark 1. Yet, by deriving a relation between P imp * (a) and P imp(a) , we can prove (18) and (20) as shown later.
Proof of Theorem 3:
First, we prove (15) . For any K ⊆ [n] with |K | = k and any i ∈ K , it holds that
where the last equality holds from (7) and (1) and (2) . Combining (22) with log
, we can derive (16) as follows:
where (a) holds because
, and (b) holds because for any j ∈ [k], (8) and (22) implies that.
Next, we will prove (17). Let a
Then, (17) can be derived as follows:
Here, (a) follows from that the RHS is the probability such that an impersonation attack generating
and (c) from the log-sum inequality. In order to derive (18) and (20), we need the following lemma. 
Then,
Proof: From the definition of P imp(a) given by (5), we have
where the last inequality follows from (26). Since (28) holds for any (V O , V I ) satisfying the maximization condition of (4), we obtain (27).
Now we prove (18). For any
where the first equality holds since S L , V O , and V I are mutually independent by the definitions of impersonation attacks and (k, L, n) ramp SSSs. Combining (29) with Lemma 1, we obtain
Hence, (18) holds from (17), (30), and P sub(a) ≥ P imp(a) . Finally, we prove (20). Suppose that
[a] be the first a symbols of S L . Then, we have
where the first equality holds since S [a] , V O , and V I are mutually independent. Combining (31) with Lemma 1, we obtain
Hence, (20) follows from (17), (32), and P sub(a) ≥ P imp(a) .
The next theorem gives lower bounds of P imp * (1) , P imp(1) , P sub(a) based on the cardinalities of shares, i.e., |V i |.
Theorem 4:
For any (k, L, n) ramp SSS (ϕ, ψ) and any i ∈ [n], it holds that
Proof of Theorem 4: From (22) and (25), for any K ⊆ [n] with |K | = k and any i ∈ K ,
Hence we have (33). Furthermore, if (ϕ, ψ) is a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS, then from (32) and (33), we have the second inequality in (34). On the other hand, the first inequality in (34) holds since P sub(a) ≥ P sub(1) ≥ P imp(1) holds for 1 ≤ a ≤ k − 1. Hence Theorem 4 is proved.
Remark 4:
We note that (15)- (18) 
Remark 5: When S j is uniformly distributed over S, from (34) we have
We note that this bound is not tight because it is looser than Ogata et al.'s bound (14) in the case of L = 1.
Direct Part
In this section, we propose a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS against substitution attacks. Here, we assume that each S j is uniformly distributed over S = GF(p m ), where m is a positive integer and p is a prime number satisfying p ≥ L + 2. Also, let l ∈ [m], and we assume that the following two conditions hold:
Let f : GF(p m ) → GF(p l ) be a surjective linear mapping. Then, from Lemma 4 in Appendix, f satisfies the following properties:
For instance, f is given by the mapping that extracts l digits of fixed positions from m digits of x in vector representation. Now we explain the encoding procedure. We define each share by a linear (k, n) SSS. Specifically, we define W i and U i as follows:
where A and B are generator matrices of a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS and a (k, n) SSS, respectively, and
Next we describe the decoding procedure. Let V i 1 , . . . , V i k be the input of the decoder, where
In order to define the decoder, we derive a relationship among legitimate shares
where (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and (b 1 , . . . , b n ) are the columns of A and B, respectively. Then, from (42) and (43) we have
Consequently,
From (48) and (50), it always holds for legitimate shares that
Accordingly, for the input
, the decoder checks the following relation:
If (53) holds, the decoder outputs S L = S 1 . . . S L where
Otherwise, the decoder outputs ⊥.
Theorem 5:
The above scheme is a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS with correlation level (0, . . . , 0, l) p such that
Remark 6: By comparing Theorem 5 with Theorem 3, we note that in the proposed scheme,
is within log p L −log p (1− p −mL ) from the bound (18). In addition, P imp(a) , 1 ≤ a ≤ L − 1, achieves the minimum in strong (k, L, n) ramp SSSs with correlation level (0, . . . , 0, l) p , and log p P sub(a) , 1 ≤ a ≤ L − 1, is within log p L − log p (1 − p −ma ) from the bound (20). Furthermore, by comparing (37) with (59), P sub(a) , 1 ≤ a ≤ k − 1, is within L/(1 − p −m ) times the lower bound of strong (k, L, n) ramp SSSs with |V i | = p m+l . Table 1 summarizes the success probabilities of substitution attacks and impersonation attacks for the proposed scheme.
Remark 7:
It is an open problem whether we can construct a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS with any given correlation level (l 1 , . . . , l k−1 ) p such that l 1 , . . . , l k−2 can also contribute to detection of substitution attacks. Now, we prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5:
First we prove the following lemma.
In particular, these 2k − 1 random variables are mutually independent.
Proof: From (48)-(51) and d k1 0, which follows from (50) and the definition of (k, n) SSSs, there is a one-toone correspondence between (W i 1 , . . . , (48) and (49), and R 1 , . . . , R k−1 
Less than nearly L times l.b. * 1 Less than nearly L times l.b. * 1 are determined by
Hence, from the assumption that each S j is uniformly distributed,
In order to prove Theorem 5, it suffices to prove the following Claims 1-4: 
where (a) and (b) hold from the following reasons.
Hence (S L , W I ) and U I are statistically independent, which implies equality (a).
In addition, for any J ⊆ [L] with |J | = j,
where (c) holds since (S J , W I ) and U I are statistically independent, and (d) holds since W I is a set of k − j shares of
Proof of Claim 2: For any
. . , V i j are mutually independent (see, Lemma 2). In addition, for any distinct k shares V i 1 , . . . , V i k , it holds that
Here, the last equality holds since
Thus, the correlation level of shares is (0, . . . , 0, l) p proving our claim.
Proof of Claim 3: (55) follows from
is satisfied.
Proof of Claim 4:
, and V I = (W I , U I ), I = {i a+1 , . . . , i k }, are legitimate. When the attack is not detected, the decoder outputs
Let
From (53) and (54), attack is successful (i.e., ψ(
and
On the other hand, from (52), the legitimate shares satisfy
From (68), (70), and (40), we have
Hence the condition ψ(V O , V I ) {S L , ⊥} is given by (69) and (71), and the condition ψ(V O , V I ) ⊥ is given by (71). We prove that the success probabilities of impersonation attacks satisfy (57) and (58). First, (57) follows from
Here (a) holds because
U O is uniformly distributed over GF(p m ) a , and d 11 , . . . , d a1 are non-zero by the definition of (k, n) SSSs. Next, (58) follows from
where (b)-(d) hold from the following reasons.
(c) The following relation holds by the same reason as (a) in (73):
where (e) holds because just (p m ) a−rank C a values of
. . , W i k are given. From this and
C L is regular, which implies rank C a = min{a, L}. Hence (f) holds. Now, we can prove (59). As P sub(a) is non-decreasing in a, it suffices to focus on the special case when a = k − 1, i.e., O = {i 1 , . . . , i k−1 } and I = {i k }. We evaluate the success probability of substitution attack for the case that the values of forged shares are
Then, the following lemma holds.
Then, the equation
has at most qp m−l solutions for w i k ∈ GF(p m ).
Proof of Lemma 3:
Hence the polynomial g(w O , w O , w i k ) in w i k has degree at most q, and the term of degree q is
We have q + 1 0 and
respectively. In addition, c kq 0 holds from (48) and the fact that no information on S q can be obtained from (W i 1 , . . . , W i k−1 ). Hence the coefficient of w
In addition, the equation
Hence (78) can be satisfied for at most qp m−l values of w i k ∈ GF(p m ).
Using Lemma 3, the success probability of substitution attack can be evaluated as follows.
Here, (a) holds since
where (b) follows the Markov chain V O → V O → W i k and (c) follows from Lemma 2, which implies
, and Lemma 3. Since (81) holds for any v O , we have (59).
Since Claims 1-4 are satisfied as proved in the above, Theorem 5 holds.
Reasonableness of the Proposed Construction
In this section, we explain the reasonableness of the proposed construction. Specifically, we explain why we must use strong (k, L, n) ramp SSSs, not weak ones, for (W 1 , . . . , W n ), and why we use the function
First note that our scheme makes good use of the fact that (W 1 , . . . , W n ) are the shares of a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS, which implies that no information of any S i in (S 1 , . . . , S L ) leaks out even from any k − 1 shares, i.e.,
In the following, we give an example to show that if (W 1 , . . . , W n ) are defined so that (83) is not satisfied, then the scheme cannot always detect cheating. More clearly, if A in (42) is from a weak ramp SSS, instead of a strong ramp SSS, where some symbols leak out explicitly when the number of shares is less than k, (59) does not always hold.
Example 1: Set the parameters as (k, L, n) = (3, 2, 3), p = 5, and m = l = 1. Denote GF(5) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Define A in (42) and B in (43) as
Note that A is a generator matrix of a weak ramp SSS and the legitimate shares satisfy
Furthermore, we have from (43) that S 2 1 + S 3 2 = U 1 +U 2 +U 3 . Accordingly, for the input ( W 1 , U 1 ), ( W 2 , U 2 ), and ( W 3 , U 3 ), the decoder checks whether it holds that
For this scheme, a cheater can succeed in a substitution attack by forging
, which means that the attack is not detected, and S 1 = W 1 + W 2 = S 1 + 2α S 1 is decoded. Hence P sub(2) = 1 holds for this scheme.
Our scheme satisfies (59). If there exists a scheme which uses a function of (S 1 , . . . , S L ) with a smaller degree instead of L j=1 (S j ) j+1 , then the scheme might achieve less P sub(a) than (59). It is an open problem whether such a scheme exists or not. In the next example, we consider a scheme which defines (U 1 , . . . , U n ) as the shares of L j=1 (S j ) 2 instead of L j=1 (S j ) j+1 . This scheme might seem natural, but it cannot always detect cheating as shown below.
Example 2: Set the parameters as (k, L, n) = (3, 3, 3) , p = 5, and m = l = 1. Denote GF(5) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Define the shares V i = (W i , U i ), i = 1, 2, 3, as 
We note that A is a generator matrix of a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS. Then, the legitimate shares satisfy 
Hence, the attack is not detected, and S 1 = 4W 1 +W 2 +3W 3 = S 1 + 3α S 1 is decoded. Therefore, P sub(2) = 1 holds for this scheme.
Conclusion
In this paper, we treated on cheating-detectable (k, L, n) ramp SSSs. In the converse part, we derived lower bounds on the sizes of the shares and random number used in encoding, and the success probabilities of impersonation attack and substitution attack for (k, L, n) ramp SSSs with given correlation level. We also derived a converse theorem in the form of lower bounds on the success probabilities of attacks for the given size of shares. In the direct part, we proposed a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS which can detect substitution attacks. For any correlation level (0, . . . , 0, l) p , the proposed (k, L, n) ramp SSS attains the optimal sizes of the shares and random number. Furthermore, the proposed scheme can attain the success probabilities of substitution attacks and impersonation attacks as shown in Table 1 . Finally, we explained the reasonableness of the proposed construction by showing examples of schemes similar to the proposed one but unable to detect substitution attacks.
